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 An Innovative Matrix for Dispute 
Resolution: 
The Dubai World Tribunal and the 
Global Insolvency Crisis 
Jayanth K. Krishnan* 
Harold Koster** 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines a legal experiment that occurred during the height of the 
global financial crisis.  As markets from the United States to Europe to the Global 
South shook, one country – the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) – found itself on the 
brink of economic collapse.  In particular, in 2009 the U.A.E.’s Emirate of Dubai 
(Emirate) was contemplating defaulting on $60 billion of debt it had amassed.  Rec-
ognizing that such a default would have cataclysmic reverberations across the 
globe, Dubai’s governmental leaders turned to a small group of foreign lawyers, 
judges, accountants, and business consultants for assistance.  Working in a coordi-
nated fashion, these external and internal actors soon imported into the Emirate a 
new regime of insolvency laws – and even an Anglo-American insolvency court – 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Director of the Center on the Global Legal Profession, and Charles L. Whistler 
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** Former Dean, University of Dubai, Faculty of Law and Deputy Judge, Court of Appeal, Amsterdam, 
Netherlands.  For their assistance, the authors thank Vitor Dias, Ricardo Dixon, Lara Gose, Libby Pfoten-
hauer, and Priya Purohit.  Special thanks to Ali Van Cleef who provided thorough, excellent, and first-
rate research assistance; she was also responsible for compiling the materials in Appendix A, which the 
authors reviewed and approved.  Appreciation is extended to those who gave feedback during the 2016 
Law and Society Association annual meeting in New Orleans and at a conference hosted by the Times 
Higher Education group in New Delhi in 2015.  Finally, the authors are grateful to the judges, lawyers, 
business and financial experts, Dubai World Tribunal (DWT) staff members, and Government of Dubai 
officials who gave their time educating the authors about the DWT.  Unless otherwise indicated in the 
references below, the authors anonymize these respondents’ identities to protect their confidentiality.  
The University of Dubai College of Law, in 2015, applied for and received funding from the DWT to 
examine how insolvency tribunals function since the worldwide economic crisis of 2008-2009.  The 
College invited Professor Krishnan onto the project because of his experience in the areas of comparative 
law, judicial institutions, and the legal profession, and because he was the senior author of the lead study 
on the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts published in 2014.  (This previous study was 
funded by the National Center for State Courts, Virginia, USA).  Professor Krishnan has no affiliation 
to either the DWT or the University of Dubai.  The research focus here includes a review of the back-
ground to the establishment of the DWT and a legal analysis of the effectiveness of combining civil law 
disputes with common law procedures.  Neither Professor Krishnan nor Dean Koster (who too has no 
affiliation with the DWT) received any salary or consulting fees in the undertaking of this research.  The 
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researchers. 
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to help resolve Dubai’s financial troubles.  Drawing upon elite theory scholarship, 
as well as on primary and secondary sources of data, this study argues that tradi-
tional ways of analyzing foreign influences on a domestic landscape need to be re-
fined and further nuanced to consider such important comparative cases as Dubai. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than eight years have passed since Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy 
in the United States.  The scale of Lehman’s downfall in autumn 2008, and its ef-
fects on markets around the globe, has continued to intrigue scholars, policymakers, 
private sector stakeholders, and the media.1 Escaping attention from many observ-
ers, however, is that about one year after Lehman collapsed, another global financial 
institution was on the brink of failing.  The Dubai World Corporation (Dubai 
World), based in the United Arab Emirates (in the Emirate of Dubai), is a govern-
ment owned holding company that by November 2009 had incurred nearly $60 bil-
lion in debt.2  During its peak, Dubai World employed more than 100,000 workers 
and had some 200 subsidiaries worldwide.3  Yet by the late fourth quarter of 2009, 
Dubai World informed its existing creditors that it would not be able to service its 
debts until the following year.4 
This announcement caused massive waves.  Markets in Europe, Asia, and the 
United States tumbled; investment agencies downgraded Dubai; and there was great 
fear that a default by the Dubai government would have lasting negative ramifica-
tions for the Middle East and other international markets.5  Furthermore, experts 
                                                          
 1. For a sample of works on this subject, see generally KEN AULETTA, GREED AND GLORY ON WALL 
STREET: THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LEHMAN (2015) (discussing the history of Lehman Brothers and 
what led to its downfall after the 2008 financial crisis); Christian Hofmann, Central Bank Collateral and 
the Lehman Collapse, 6 CAPITAL MKTS. L.J. 256 (2011) (examining how the Lehman collapse had re-
verberating effects on European markets); PETER CHAPMAN, THE LAST OF THE IMPERIOUS RICH: 
LEHMAN BROTHERS, 1844-2008 (2010) (providing a narrative of how Henry and Emmanuel Lehman 
built their company); Charles Hines et al., An Analysis of Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy and Repo 105 
Transactions, 26 AM. J. BUS. 40 (2011) (investigating how Lehman used Repo 105 transactions to con-
tinue leveraging the value of its business); Chitru S. Fernando et al., The Value of Investment Banking 
Relationships: Evidence from the Collapse of Lehman Brothers, 67 J. FIN. 235 (2011) (examining how 
firms that depended upon Lehman’s services were affected by its collapse). 
 2. See Michael D. Nolan et al., Leviathan on Life Support? Restructuring Sovereign Debt and Inter-
national Investment Protection after Abaclat, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & 
POLICY 2011-2012, at 532 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2013); TODD A. KNOOP, GLOBAL FINANCE IN EMERGING 
MARKET ECONOMIES 202 (2013). 
 3. Christopher Hall et al., Shifting sands: Insolvency and restructuring law reform in the Middle 
East, MONDAQ (May 29, 2012), http://www.mondaq.com/x/179356/Insolvency,+Administra-
tion,+Bankruptcy+and+Liquidation/Shifting+Sands+Insolvency+And+Restructuring+Law+Re-
form+In+The+Middle+East; REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 425 (Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2015) (chart of Dubai 
World subsidiaries). 
 4. Specifically, May of 2010.  See Matt Smith & Enjy Kiwan, Dubai seeks debt delay, some units 
cut to junk, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/25/us-dubai-economy-
idUSTRE5AO4Z120091125#eK5PUSo4u0WZPySl.97. 
 5. See Laura Cochrane & Tal Barak Harif, Dubai Debt Delay Rattles Confidence in Gulf Borrowers, 
INDEP. (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.independent.ie/business/world/dubai-debt-crisis-rattles-confidence-
in-persian-gulf-borrowers-26585888.html. 
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made ominous comparisons between these events in Dubai with what had occurred 
during the Argentine economic crisis nearly a decade earlier.6 
Fortunately, a few weeks later, Dubai’s neighboring Emirate, Abu Dhabi, of-
fered crucial financial assistance to Dubai World.  A multi-billion dollar “lifeline”7 
from the government of Abu Dhabi allowed Dubai World to meet critical short-
term obligations, and it helped set the stage for the corporation to begin the process 
of seeking to re-structure its other debts.8  With Abu Dhabi coming to the rescue, 
Dubai’s financial crisis had been temporarily averted, even though the terms of the 
deal for the latter placed it under intense scrutiny from its various creditors, includ-
ing Abu Dhabi itself.9 
What caused Abu Dhabi to inject this infusion of capital into Dubai?  A com-
bination of factors appears to have made the difference.  First, although tacit eco-
nomic and political competition had long existed between the two,10 both govern-
ments understood that if they did not work together to address the financial crisis, 
the entire federal republic was at risk of a major, long-term economic depression.11  
Second, both governments have deep familial connections.  Each respective ruling 
family traces its roots to the Bani Yas clan, which came to the area that is now the 
U.A.E. in the 1700s.12  Third, a decision undertaken by the Dubai government in 
November and December of 2009, when the financial crisis was at its peak, argua-
bly was the most important development that occurred.  During this two-month pe-
riod, Dubai quickly brought together experts from abroad to develop a creative legal 
and insolvency-based framework aimed towards allaying the fears of creditors 
clamoring for their money.  Included within this framework was an important alter-
native dispute resolution tribunal intended to resolve cases between such creditors 
and their corresponding debtors. 
This study will focus on this last point.  As the research below shall illustrate, 
the Dubai government affirmatively opted to look for external assistance to cope 
with its economic crisis.  Rather than staying wedded to its traditional legal and 
financial regimes, the government brought in outside experts who had knowledge, 
talent, and experience in dealing with modern, complicated, cross-border insol-
vency emergencies.  The narrative described below will support this paper’s thesis 
that consultation with these external actors and the careful adoption of their ideas 
helped to provide crucial credibility to the government at a significant moment in 
its history. 
To that end, Section II will set forth the theoretical frame within which the 
paper will operate.  Section III will then provide the history of how such actors from 
                                                          
 6. See Experts Weigh In on Dubai Debt Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 27, 2009) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-11-27/experts-weigh-in-on-dubai-debt-crisis. 
 7. Landon Thomas, Jr., Abu Dhabi Tightens Its Grip as It Offers Help to Dubai, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
14, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/business/global/15dubai.html?_r=0. 
 8. Haris Anwar, Abu Dhabi Bails Out Dubai World With $10 Billion, LEBANON WIRE (Dec. 14, 
2009), http://www.lebanonwire.com/0912MLN/09121410BB.asp. 
 9. Thomas, Jr., supra note 7. 
 10. Id. (noting how Abu Dhabi, on the one hand, is wealthier, has large amounts of natural oil re-
sources, and is the federal capital of the country, while Dubai has been the hub of foreign investment 
and is considered a more Western-friendly environment). 
 11. Margaret Coker, Dubai’s Rescue Boosts Others, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703442904574594972353375760. 
 12. Thomas, Jr., supra note 7. See also History: Bani Yas, HIS HIGHNESS SHEIKH MOHAMMED BIN 
RASHID AL MAKTOUM, http://www.sheikhmohammed.com/vgn-ext-templating/v/index.jsp?vgnex-
toid=499b4c8631cb4110VgnVCM100000b0140a0aRCRD (last visited Dec. 20, 2016). 
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overseas – namely in this case, foreign lawyers, foreign judges, and foreign finan-
cial advisors – worked with Dubai’s leaders to draft a decree that established an 
insolvency regime and accompanying adjudicatory tribunal that would serve as con-
fidence-building measures for both international creditors and Dubai World.  Sec-
tion IV will evaluate how this judicial tribunal has functioned since its inception, as 
well as how its jurisdiction has expanded beyond what was originally conceived by 
the decree’s drafters.  Section V will conclude by discussing what the situation is in 
Dubai today, five years after the economic crisis hit.  As this concluding section 
will suggest, the cooperation between the external actors and Dubai’s government 
staved-off a disastrous outcome for the Emirate, the U.A.E, and international mar-
kets.  In sum, this story lends further support to the argument that external actors, 
given the right conditions (and especially in the present globalized climate), can 
indeed provide important tangible relief, not to mention legitimacy, to a state that 
finds itself in need of both. 
II. ESTABLISHING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The above argument that external actors with special expertise can shape public 
policy agendas of domestic governments is grounded in a discourse that has a long 
tradition of academic scholarship.  Frequently referred to as the “elite theory” 
school of thought, this perspective has seen contributions from a diverse array of 
scholars.13  The main principle guiding this theory is that those with a combination 
of experience, skills, resources, power, and connections can and do affect the policy 
choices made by government officials.14  Importantly, this literature emphasizes 
that these actors do not have to be always unified and can have diverse characteris-
tics.  Moreover, those with influence do not possess it indefinitely, and often new 
actors eventually enter the public policy space and seek to exert their influence on 
the state.15 
In terms of foreign actors specifically affecting the legal systems and legal pro-
fessions of countries that are not indigenous to them, the literature is replete with 
narratives.  The impact of colonial rule is a paradigm that immediately springs to 
mind.  For example, the exporting of common law jurisprudence, along with the 
                                                          
 13. See generally FLOYD HUNTER, COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF DECISION MAKERS 
(1953) (describing how a small group of elites shape policy in a range of venues); CHARLES WRIGHT 
MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956) (arguing that those with power in politics, business, and the military 
prevent ordinary citizens from exercising meaningful influence in these spaces); ELMER ERIC 
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
(1960) (discussing how a small group of people in the upper class segments of society inhibit the masses 
from participating broadly); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITES 
(1976) (focusing on the role of national politicians in a range of countries as being the main drivers in 
the formulation of public policy). 
 14. HUNTER, supra note 13; MILLS, supra note 13; SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 13; PUTNAM, supra 
note 13; see also ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE 
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (1962) (focusing on the oligopolistic nature of 
political parties and trade unions); VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY: A TREATISE ON 
GENERAL SOCIOLOGY (1963); GAETANO MOSCA, THE RULING CLASS (1966) (discussing the shifting 
nature of power between conservatives who he classified as “lions” and radicals that he saw as “foxes”). 
 15. Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Towards a Historical Analysis of Elites in Latin America 25-26 (July 
12-16, 2009) (Paper presented at the 21st World Congress of Political Science, Santiago, Chile), 
http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/view/744; PARETO, supra note 14. 
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training of solicitors and barristers who could then practice within the colonies, re-
mains a significant legacy left by British imperialism.16  Continental European rul-
ers also imparted their respective civil codes (together with the structural roles law-
yers and judges should play) within their colonies – whether in Latin America or 
different parts of Africa and Asia.17 
From the United States, several initiatives emerged throughout the 20th century.  
As early as 1913, entrepreneurial American lawyers traveled to places such as Bra-
zil to work not just as lawyers who would advise on U.S. law but also as domestic 
practitioners.18  Dezalay and Garth note similar patterns of migration by American 
lawyers in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico.19  Abel and Lewis, too, have documented 
the journeys of U.S. lawyers abroad in various works,20 as has Carole Silver who 
discusses how in France when regulations were lax, Americans served as conseils 
juridiques.21 
In terms of non-governmental institutional influence, perhaps there is no more 
important example than the American-based Ford Foundation’s efforts, beginning 
in the 1950s.  Through the hiring of mainly American and British lawyer-consult-
ants, Ford advised governments in Latin America, South Asia, and Africa on how 
                                                          
 16. See generally Samuel Schmitthenner, A Sketch of the Development of the Legal Profession in 
India, 3 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 339 (1968-1969) (discussing the history of the profession during colonial 
and then post-colonial times); Marc Galanter & V.S. Rehki, The Impending Transformation of the Indian 
Legal Profession (1996) (unpublished paper) (on file with author) (discussing how legal practice in India 
changed with liberalization and reforms in legal education); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, ASIAN 
LEGAL REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE (2010) (describing how legal elites in the col-
onies of different European empires became leaders in the march for their respective national independ-
ence); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Globetrotting Law Firms, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 57 (2010) (outlining 
how Indian law firms evolved over the past three centuries). 
 17. Richard Abel, Western Courts in Non-Western Settings: Patterns of Court Use in Colonial and 
New-Colonial Africa, in THE IMPOSITION OF LAW 167-200 (Barbara E. Harrell-Bond & Sandra B. Bur-
man eds., 1979); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: 
LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002) [herein-
after DEZALAY & GARTH, PALACE WARS]; M.C. MIROW: LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF 
PRIVATE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA (2004); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Academic 
SAILERS: The Ford Foundation and the Efforts to Shape Legal Education in Africa, 1957-1977, 52 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 261, 263 (2012) [hereinafter Krishnan, Academic SAILERS]; Joaquim Falcão, Lawyers 
in Brazil, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 400 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis 
eds., 1988); Frederico Almeida, A Nobreza Togada: As Elites Jurídicas e a Política da Justiça no Brasil, 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of São Paulo, Department of Political Science) (on file with 
authors).  During the 1800s, when many colonies gained independence from their European rulers, for-
eign influence continued, despite the absence of formal governmental rule.  It was not uncommon for 
students from Latin America to spend time in Continental Europe for schooling or for tutelage under 
practicing lawyers.  Similarly, following the Second World War, when many British and French colonies 
became free, students from these newly independent states traveled to study law in places such as London 
and Paris.  Quintin Johnstone, American Assistance to African Legal Education, 46 TUL. L. REV. 657, 
666 (1972); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford 
Foundation, and the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 447 (2004) [here-
inafter Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield]. 
 18. Jayanth K. Krishnan et al., Legal Elites and the Shaping of Corporate Law Practice in Brazil: A 
Historical Study, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 346 (2016) (noting how over the course of the next four 
decades, these Americans established offices in Brazil, partnered with domestic Brazilians, and helped 
to shape a Brazilian corporate bar with lasting remnants that are still seen today). 
 19. DEZALAY & GARTH, PALACE WARS, supra note 17. 
 20. RICHARD L. ABEL & PHILLIP S.C. LEWIS, LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD 
(1988); Richard L. Abel & Phillip S.C. Lewis, Putting Law Back into the Sociology of Lawyers, in 
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW 281 (Richard L. Abel & Phillip S.C. Lewis eds., 1995). 
 21. Carole Silver, Regulatory Mismatch in the International Market for Legal Services, 23 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 487, 531 (2003). 
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to initiate changes in legal education, the courts, and the legal profession.22  Ford’s 
theory was that a society with good lawyers would be beneficial in multiple ways: 
these professionals would ideally serve as leaders in key sectors such as business, 
economics, civil society, and politics.  In Latin America and South Asia, previous 
scholarship has discussed the mixed results of Ford’s efforts.23  Ford’s work in Af-
rica, however, has the most direct relevance for this study on Dubai. 
Early on, Ford’s astute Africa officers recognized that to influence the domestic 
legal landscape, they needed buy-in from the local bar, bench, and educational es-
tablishments in the countries in which they worked.24  Ford thus affirmatively de-
cided to take its lead from these domestic legal professionals.  The lawyer-consult-
ants Ford hired worked together with their African colleagues in trying to improve 
and develop the local legal systems.25  Even though not all the legal programs that 
Ford established were successful during this time,26 there was little resentment 
among either the Americans or Africans, or a sense that the former were on the 
continent for exploitative, instrumental purposes.27 
There are obvious political, socio-economic, and historical differences between 
Africa and Dubai.  Yet, parallels exist between how Ford ran its Africa project and 
                                                          
 22. JOHN S. BAINBRIDGE, THE SAILER PROJECT: 1962-1967, FORD FOUNDATION DOCUMENT 7 (July 
1967) (on file with author) (outlining the origins of sending new American law graduates to Africa to 
teach in African law schools); David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some 
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development, WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974) (questioning the value of 
projects where Americans travel overseas to assist in legal reform); JAMES GARDNER, LEGAL 
IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980) (describing and then 
criticizing efforts by American development organizations to improve law, legal education, and the legal 
profession in Latin America); Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield, supra note 17, at 449-468; Krishnan, Ac-
ademic SAILERS, supra note 17, at 267-313. 
 23. In India, for example, during the 1950s and 1960s, Ford hired a series of consultants from the 
United States –mainly law professors – to provide input on how best to help the Indians improve their 
legal education system.  The theory was that engaging in this endeavor would have a causal effect to-
wards enhancing the quality of lawyering and legal representation for the millions who were not having 
their needs met. However, shortly after they arrived onto the scene, the American academics recognized 
that they knew very little about the local context.  They advised Ford to pay more attention to what the 
actors on the ground were doing and to learn from these individuals as well.  To its credit, as the years 
went on Ford reorganized its legal profession and legal education programs, and the lessons learned 
during this venture helped inform how it operated in other regions, such as Latin America. Krishnan, 
Professor Kingsfield, supra note 17, at 449-468; Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Bread for the 
Poor: Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789, 795-798 (2004); 
Jayanth K. Krishnan et al., Grappling at the Grassroots: Access to Justice in India’s Lower Tier, 27 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 151, 154-157 (2014). Although, as it relates to Latin America, some years back, see 
generally GARDNER, supra note 22 (arguing that Ford wrongly encouraged Latin American law students 
and lawyers during the 1960s to be social welfare advocates and nation-builders, in the image of how 
many U.S. lawyers in this same period were acting and contending that Ford’s imposing and imprudent 
initiatives fomented anti-Americanism and contributed to the rise in non-democratic regimes in many of 
these countries).  However, Gardner’s analysis has been seriously criticized by Faundez, who argues that 
Ford’s efforts, while having some drawbacks, were not as negative as Gardner suggested.  Faundez also 
contends that, like in India, Ford learned from its missteps.  Julio Faundez, James A. Gardner: Legal 
Imperialism. American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America, 14 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 206, 206-
208 (1982) (book review). 
 24. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22; JOHN S. BAINBRIDGE, STUDY AND TEACHING OF LAW IN AFRICA 
(1972) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, AFRICA]; Krishnan, Academic SAILERS, supra note 17, at 278-313. 
 25. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22; BAINBRIDGE, AFRICA, supra note 24; Krishnan, Academic SAILERS, 
supra note 17, at 278-313. 
 26. The time period being referred to here was from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. 
 27. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield, supra note 17, at 278-319 (identifying only a single instance of 
resentment during the program). 
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what has occurred in Dubai over the past seven years.  As the financial woes of 
Dubai World grew during 2009, experts from abroad who had sophisticated inter-
national skills and a deep knowledge of global insolvency practices came to Dubai 
to help repair the economic damage that was placing the Emirate on the verge of 
default.28 
But this point requires another layer.  Although they were invited, it was im-
perative for these external actors to establish strong bonds within various sectors of 
the government.  After all, the Emiratis were still in control of the state.  They held 
power, and Dubai’s Ruler was the one individual who had to approve any changes 
to the Emirate’s legal structure.  Furthermore, having good relationships with civil 
society Emiratis was also crucial, because they had the everyday pulse of the private 
sector.  Thus, borrowing from a combination of Dezalay and Garth’s work and 
Bourdieu’s terminology, the external actors in this Dubai narrative possessed valu-
able social capital.  Yet, this resource could only be effectively deployed if key 
local actors cooperated and were regarded as equal partners in the deliberations.29  
Otherwise put, to find a solution to the Dubai World crisis, the external actors 
needed to work together with their domestic counterparts.  As the ensuing discus-
sion illustrates, such a situation indeed occurred. 
III. THE HISTORY OF THE DUBAI WORLD COMPANY CRISIS 
A. Methodology 
As indicated in the Introduction, the financial crisis of Dubai World reached its 
peak at the end of 2009.  However, cracks within the company’s financial situation 
began to show earlier that year.  This Section describes the events that led to the 
near collapse of the company and what would have been a likely default of the 
Dubai government to its various creditors had emergency measures not been taken.  
Yet, before beginning this discussion, a brief explanation of how the authors ac-
quired their information on this subject is needed. 
During 2015, the authors were able to interview virtually all of the major stake-
holders involved in Dubai’s financial crisis.30  The respondents included those for-
eign lawyers who played a significant role in drafting the decree that established the 
new legal regime for Dubai World’s insolvency situation, as well as those who have 
litigated matters in the Dubai World Tribunal since.  In addition, interviews were 
conducted with those foreign business consultants and foreign accountants who ad-
vised the Dubai government during the crisis.  Members of the Dubai World Tribu-
nal also were interviewed, as was the Tribunal’s registrar, and a key Emirati gov-
ernment official agreed to meet with the authors as well.  In sum, twelve foreign 
                                                          
 28. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
 29. DEZALAY & GARTH, PALACE WARS, supra note 17, at 49 (for the Americans circulating into the 
Brazilian market; and discussing the “coming together of [Brazilian] local know-who with U.S. local 
know-how”); Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups, 14 THEORY & SOC’Y 723, 
723 (1985); Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241 (John G. Richardson ed., 1986); See also DEZALAY & GARTH, supra 
note 16, at 1-19; F.M. Kay & J. Hagan, Cultivating clients in the competition for partnership: Gender 
and the organizational restructuring of law firms in the 1990s, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 517, 527 (1999). 
 30. For most of the interviews, the authors conducted these together.  However, where noted below, 
some took place where only one of the authors was present. 
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lawyers, three of the Tribunal’s four judges, three business and financial advisors, 
the Tribunal’s registrar, and an important figure from the Department of Finance all 
participated in the interview process.31 
Finally, to supplement the interview data, the authors also relied on two other 
sources of information.  First, business media reports, academic articles and books, 
law firm and accounting firm publications, and governmental papers were studied.  
Second, the authors analyzed all the published and available judgments rendered by 
the Tribunal – a total of 82 decisions.  The docket, of course, includes all of Dubai 
World’s insolvency cases.  But as will be seen shortly, surprisingly the clear major-
ity of cases involve other unrelated matters, thereby illustrating an important expan-
sion of the Tribunal’s powers. 
B. The Events of 2009 & Dubai World 
Dubai World was founded as a “[g]lobal holding company”32 by the Emirate’s 
Ruler, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, in 2006.33  Then, and to this 
day, Dubai World’s “portfolio contains some of the world’s leading companies in 
their industries, including Drydocks World, Economic Zones World, Istithmar 
World and majority ownership of DP World.”34  As of this writing, its current head 
is Sheikh Ahmed Bin Saeed Al Maktoum.35  As stated above, Dubai World has 
investments, multiple subsidiaries, and a workforce that spans the globe.36 
A great deal of Dubai World’s investments also has included real estate, which 
during 2006 and 2007 appeared to be a wise venture.  However, towards the latter 
half of 2007 and in the years following, Dubai World suffered from the downslide 
in the real estate market.  Within the Emirate, there was a catastrophic “local prop-
erty crash.”37  Consider that just between the third and fourth quarters in 2008 home 
                                                          
 31. What is perhaps most intriguing about the respondents mentioned here is that their number appears 
quite small.  It is true that these individuals had many colleagues and subordinates who followed their 
directions and worked diligently during this entire period.  But the fact is that only a relatively tiny group 
of thought-leaders and experts formulated and then implemented the macro-policy measures that 
emerged at the end of 2009.  Recall that during this time there was great anxiety and fear, but there 
remained two clear objectives: to ensure that the Emirate did not default, and to address the monetary 
and legal claims of global creditors against the debtor-Dubai World Corporation.  Given the extreme 
pressures of those final months of 2009, for logistical purposes alone, it is understandable why the gov-
ernment tasked a small, sophisticated group of experts to solve the crisis. Also, the authors came to know 
that the individuals interviewed were among the key group of players in this story through a combination 
of means, including employing referral sampling and snowball sampling methods.  The first author, 
through his prior work on the Dubai courts, knew the registrar of the DWT, Mark Beer, who was inti-
mately involved in drafting the insolvency framework in 2009.  Beer provided the names of others – 
lawyers, judges, and Dubai government officials – who also were significantly involved.  And then these 
respondents provided names of others who they thought would be important to interview.  Respondents 
were also identified from business news media accounts, which named key officials in and outside of 
government who were working on the new insolvency regime and its aftermath. 
 32. Dubai World, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/company/dubai-world (last visited Dec. 10, 
2016); DUBAI WORLD, http://www.dubaiworld.ae/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
 33. LINKEDIN, supra note 32; DUBAI WORLD, supra note 32. 
 34. LINKEDIN, supra note 32; DUBAI WORLD, supra note 32. 
 35. HH Sheikh Ahmed Bin Saeed Al Maktoum, DUBAI WORLD, http://www.dubaiworld.ae/hh-sheikh-
ahmed/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2016). 
 36. See LINKEDIN, supra note 32; DUBAI WORLD, supra note 32. 
 37. Tom Arnold & David French, Dubai World gets majority creditor backing $14.6 billion debt deal, 
REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/12/us-dubai-world-restructuring-
idUSKBN0KL0R520150112#RwDA1zkTqtUkXZfC.97. 
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prices plummeted twenty-five percent, while “[h]igh-end apartments and villas 
were the worst-hit, with prices falling [on average] 35% in Q4 . . . .”38  Perhaps the 
most well-known of these elite complexes, the Palm Jumeirah properties (in which 
Dubai World had invested), sank to nearly two-thirds of their peak value.39 
According to experts, the bursting of the real estate bubble in Dubai was pre-
dictable.  In March 2006, Dubai passed a law that loosened restrictions on foreign 
investors being able to purchase property within the Emirate.40  Foreigners from 
around the globe poured money into Dubai, leading to “[e]xcessive short-term spec-
ulative activity . . . .”41  The result was that investors were willing to pay top-price 
for real estate.  Many who successfully purchased property then subsequently lev-
eraged these assets to make other investments.42 
Dubai World was among those who sought to benefit during these prosperous 
times.  It and its subsidiaries engaged a range of investments, property purchases, 
and construction projects.43  However, once the global financial crisis hit in 2008, 
foreign capital fled Dubai.44  By February 2009, roughly “half of all the construction 
projects in the UAE [fifty-nine in total], worth around AED1.1 trillion (US$582 
billion) . . .  [were] either put on hold or cancelled in response to falling demand 
and deteriorating market conditions.”45  Table 1 illustrates those projects that were 
among the largest adversely impacted by the financial crisis; three of these major 
ones were part of Dubai World’s portfolio.  (They are listed below as properties 










                                                          
 38. UAE’s housing market crash, GLOB. PROP. GUIDE (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.globalproper-
tyguide.com/Middle-East/United-Arab-Emirates/Price-History-Archive/UAEs-housing-market-crash-
112. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id.; See also New Law Encourages Foreign Ownership in Dubai Property Like Condo Hotels, 
CONDO HOTELS DUBAI, http://www.condohotelsdubai.com/articles/foreign-ownership.htm (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2016).  See also The Foreign Ownership of Property in Dubai, LOUVRE GROUP (Apr. 3, 2013), 
http://www.louvregroup.com/the-foreign-ownership-of-property-in-dubai/. 
 41. UAE’s housing market crash, supra note 38.  See also New Law Encourages Foreign Ownership 
in Dubai Property Like Condo Hotels, CONDO HOTELS DUBAI, http://www.condohotelsdubai.com/arti-
cles/foreign-ownership.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).  See also The Foreign Ownership of Property 
in Dubai, LOUVRE GROUP (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.louvregroup.com/the-foreign-ownership-of-prop-
erty-in-dubai. 
 42. See UAE’s housing market crash, supra note 38.  See also New Law Encourages Foreign Owner-
ship in Dubai Property Like Condo Hotels, CONDO HOTELS DUBAI, http://www.condoho-
telsdubai.com/articles/foreign-ownership.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).  See also The Foreign Own-
ership of Property in Dubai, LOUVRE GROUP (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.louvregroup.com/the-foreign-
ownership-of-property-in-dubai. 
 43. For a history of Dubai World’s activities on this point, see DUBAI WORLD, www.dubaiworld.ae. 
 44. UAE’s housing market crash, supra note 38. 
 45. Id. 
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 46. UAE’s housing market crash, supra note 38. 
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As Table 1 indicates, Dubai’s finances were clearly in trouble.  In fact, during 
February 2009, the U.A.E. Central Bank loaned $20 billion to government-related 
entities of Dubai (including Dubai World) to meet their debt payment obligations.47  
But the problems for Dubai World continued to mount during that summer and into 
the fall.  By late 2009, the Dubai government had accumulated $80 billion in debt, 
of which 60 billion belonged to Dubai World.48  On November 25, the government’s 
Department of Finance declared, to the astonishment of many in the international 
markets, that Dubai World would be seeking a “standstill”49 on any further pay-
ments to its creditors.  Various observers referred to this decision as a “disaster,”50 
“shocking,”51 and “the biggest sovereign-related credit event since the start of the 
[2008 global economic] crisis.”52 
It is unclear whether the government anticipated such a fierce response.  Re-
gardless, it had already been working on plans to reorganize the Emirate’s insol-
vency regime precisely to calm the worries of Dubai World’s global creditors.  The 
developments that occurred are examined next. 
                                                          
 47. The financial aid package, specifically, was in the form of bond relief.  The Dubai government 
issued 20 billion dollars in bonds for its government related entities, of which Dubai World was a part, 
and whereby the U.A.E. Central Bank purchased half of the issued bonds, with two Abu Dhabi banks 
buying one-fourth, and the Abu Dhabi government buying the remaining amount.  For a discussion of 
this point, see OXFORD BUSINESS GROUP, THE REPORT: ABU DHABI 2010, at 42 (2010). 
 48. See James Drummond & Andrew England, Dubai World asks for debt ‘standstill’, FIN. TIMES 
(Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8a7a78e6-d9b9-11de-ad94-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3rCfrfTM2. See also Smith & Kiwan, supra note 4. 
 49. David Teather, Dubai World seeks debt standstill, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/nov/25/dubai-world-debt-standstill; Drummond & Eng-
land, supra note 48. 
 50. Drummond & England, supra note 48. 
 51. Teather, supra note 49. 
 52. Id. 
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C. The Lead-Up to Reform and Decree 57 
In 2004, the government opened the Dubai International Financial Centre 
(DIFC).  Previous research has examined the DIFC and its purpose and frame-
work,53 but briefly, the Centre serves as the Emirate’s main zone for international 
business.54  The DIFC is a multi-acre campus that houses firms from a diverse array 
of sectors from around the globe.55  Established under Dubai Law No. 9, the DIFC 
was created in order to make Dubai one of the leading commercial capitals in the 
world.56  In addition, the DIFC has the authority to oversee matters involving busi-
ness law, property law, and employment law.57  There is a set of English-speaking 
common law courts that adjudicates matters not just between parties located within 
the campus but also between competing parties (within or outside of the Emirate), 
so long as they give consent.58 
In February 2009, as Dubai World and its subsidiaries were witnessing the be-
ginnings of their financial woes, the prestigious American law firm of Latham & 
Watkins hosted a meeting on insolvency and restructuring practices.59  The seminar 
brought experts from around the globe to the DIFC, including bankers, financial 
analysts, and members of the international press.60  The European High Yield Bond 
Association, CNBC, and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
also were sponsors of the conference, and members of the Dubai government par-
ticipated as well.61 
After the conference concluded, these Dubai officials briefed a group of these 
experts on the serious financial situation that the government and Dubai World were 
facing.62  Specifically, one of the latter’s key subsidiaries, Nakheel PJSC, was hav-
ing difficulty fulfilling its obligations to a sukuk that it had issued to its creditors.  
Islamic law traditionally forbids “the charging or payment of interest.”63  While a 
sukuk is effectively a bond, it adheres to Islamic law, because it “grants the investor 
a share of an asset, along with the commensurate cash flows and risk.”64  Sukuks 
                                                          
 53. Jayanth K. Krishnan & Priya Purohit, A Common Law Court in an Uncommon Environment: The 
DIFC Judiciary and Global Commercial Dispute Resolution, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 497, 497-98 
(2014). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, Middle East Offices Managing Partner, Latham & 
Watkins (Oct. 19, 2015). 
 60. Id.  See also telephone interview with Aaron Bielenberg, former Latham & Watkins associate 
(Dec. 7, 2015).  See also Program Agenda for the Middle East Restructuring and Turnaround Confer-
ence, (Feb. 3, 2009) (on file with authors). 
 61. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59; Telephone interview with Aaron 
Bielenberg, supra note 60.  See Program Agenda, supra note 60. 
 62. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59; Telephone interview with Aaron 
Bielenberg, supra note 60. 
 63. What is Sukuk?, ISLAMIC DEV. BANK, http://thatswhy.isdb.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDe-
velopments/Internet/thatswhy/en/sukuk/what-is-sukuk.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2016). 
 64. Id. 
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have been generously issued by companies and sovereign governments in the Mid-
dle East and Asia; and Dubai World, its subsidiaries, and the Emirate itself have 
followed suit.65 
Nakheel, unfortunately, could not afford to pay off a $4 billion sukuk that was 
about to be due at the end of 2009.66  Some weeks earlier, the government of Dubai 
contacted Latham to ask for help.67  Latham had recently established offices in Du-
bai and Abu Dhabi, and it had lawyers there with extensive regional familiarity.68  
The American firm suggested that the Dubai government also call upon the ac-
claimed New York-based investment bank, Moelis & Company.69  Together, Lat-
ham and Moelis began working towards a plan that would assist the Emirate, Dubai 
World, and Nakheel address the economic crisis in which they found themselves.70 
Almost immediately, Latham wanted to convince the outstanding creditors to 
restructure and extend the maturity of the debts.71  It advised the government to 
request a reduction in the interest rates on existing loans and to amend and extend 
the payment schedule on the debts to a timetable that would be easier to meet.72  In 
addition, an announcement from the Dubai government was released in November 
2009, highlighting its economic woes and how it was considering defaulting on its 
debt obligations.73  Latham recommended this move for two reasons.  First, such a 
public proclamation signaled a transparency to the markets that the Emirate under-
stood the seriousness of its financial situation.74  Second, with the government stat-
ing that all options were on the table, including defaulting, the world would be 
placed on notice of this predicament and might even consider providing financial 
support to the Emirate.75  Otherwise put, by openly acknowledging the problems it 
was enduring, Dubai sought to harness support from those willing to extend addi-
tional credit to the government as well as from existing creditors themselves.76 
                                                          
 65. See id.; See Bernardo Vizcaino, As sovereign issues grow, pricing and design stymie corporate 
sukuk, REUTERS (May 29, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/29/sukuk-companies-
idUSL5N0YJ0O720150529#lt6wk7JECiXuga0E.97; Frank Kane, Dubai now leading hub for sukuk 
trading, THE NAT’L (July 8, 2015), http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/dubai-now-leading-
hub-for-sukuk-trading.  Also, telephone interview with Augusto Sasso, New York Managing Partner, 
Moelis & Company (Dec. 16, 2015). 
 66. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.; See Frank Kane, Dubai debt adviser Moelis will list on Wall Street, THE NAT’L (Apr. 15, 
2014), http://www.thenational.ae/business/industry-insights/markets/dubai-debt-adviser-moelis-will-
list-on-wall-street; see also Markets take little comfort in Dubai World’s plan to restructure $26B in 
debt, DAILY NEWS (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/markets-comfort-dubai-
world-plan-restructure-26b-debt-article-1.432933. 
 70. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. IMF, United Arab Emirates: 2009 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; Public Information No-
tice; and Statement by the Executive Director for the United Arab Emirates, Country Report No. 10/42, 
at 11-12 (Feb. 2010). 
 74. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.; See Once high-flying Dubai World now meeting with creditor panel to deal with debt crisis, 
DAILY NEWS (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/high-flying-dubai-world-meet-
ing-creditor-panel-deal-debt-crisis-article-1.432956; See also Meeting of creditors is next test for Dubai 
World, THE NAT’L (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/meeting-of-creditors-
is-next-test-for-dubai-world. 
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The strategy worked.   Following the release of the press announcement, the 
Central Bank of the U.A.E. called a meeting where government officials from Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi, among others, were present.77  At this meeting, the Abu Dhabi 
government agreed to provide a $20 billion aid package to Dubai.78  This assistance 
allowed Nakheel to pay-off the sukuk – due to mature in December 2009 — as well 
as some of Dubai World’s other debts.79  Yet, Dubai World still had additional debt 
and thus was not completely absolved.  Consequently, it and the Dubai government, 
through their American law firm, Latham, began the process of restructuring and 
negotiating an extension of the maturity dates of the other outstanding loans80 (these 
other loans were to come due in 2009, or the following year; Latham successfully 
renegotiated their terms out to 2013).81 
Abu Dhabi’s financial assistance alleviated Dubai’s immediate trouble, mainly 
as it related to those payments due in December 2009.  Given Dubai World’s overall 
financial condition, though, the company’s staff, the government, and its external 
advisors all recognized there had to be systematic change to the Emirate’s insol-
vency process, including the need to draft an entirely new legal regime to govern 
future debtor-creditor disputes surrounding Dubai World.82  Remarkably, on De-
cember 13, 2009, a landmark order, written effectively by the government’s exter-
nal advisors, was signed into law by Dubai’s Ruler, forever transforming the insol-
vency procedures to be applied to the Emirate’s largest multi-national conglomer-
ate, Dubai World.83 
D. Decree 57 
Dubai World Corporation was created as a “decree corporation” that came into 
existence through a mandate issued by the Emirate’s Ruler.84  Because of this status, 
and the fact that it did not follow the country’s regular process for incorporation, 
Dubai World was unable to seek protection from the U.A.E.’s federal laws.85  In 
fact, the external experts, together with the government’s officials, all believed that 
even if Dubai World could fall with the traditional insolvency regulations, it still 
would be unwise to do so because of the complexity of the financial crisis facing 
the corporation.86  Experts needed to devise a new code.  Enter Decree 57. 
                                                          
 77. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59.  See also Telephone Interview with 
Augusto Sasso, supra note 65. 
 78. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59.  See also Telephone Interview with 
Augusto Sasso, supra note 65.  See Dana El Baltaji, Dubai Sukuk, Abu Dhabi TDIC Spread Narrows to 
Lowest Since 2009, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-
03-31/dubai-sukuk-abu-dhabi-tdic-spread-narrows-to-lowest-since-2009. 
 79. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59; See also El Baltaii, supra note 78. 
 80. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59; See also El Baltaii, supra note 78. 
 81. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59. 
 82. Id.; Interview with Mark Beer, Registrar, DIFC Courts & DWT, in Dubai, U.A.E. (Sept. 2, 2015). 
 83. Latham & Watkins, New Dubai Decree Relating to any Future Restructuring of Dubai World and 
its Subsidiaries, CLIENT ALERT, Jan. 8, 2010, at 1. See also Telephone Interview with Augusto Sasso, 
supra note 65. 
 84. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 1. See also Hall et al., supra note 3, at 27. See also Telephone 
Interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65. 
 85. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 1. See also Hall et al., supra note 3, at 27. See also Telephone 
Interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65. 
 86. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 4.  See also Hall et al., supra note 3, at 27. See also Telephone 
Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59; Interview with Mark Beer, supra note 82; Telephone 
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In crafting Decree 57’s insolvency system, both the external experts and local 
Dubai officials agreed that the best course of action would be to build upon the laws 
already in place that governed companies within the DIFC.87  But there was senti-
ment that additional aspects of English and American insolvency laws had to be 
included as well.88  While there was overlap between the two, there was debate as 
to which model ought to be primarily followed. 
English law heavily influenced the DIFC’s insolvency regime; but the Ameri-
can experts did not believe that English law adequately protected debtor companies, 
such as Dubai World.89  In particular, they felt that the rules under the English sys-
tem for accessing moratorium protection from creditors were too harsh.90  The 
American experts believed, and ultimately persuaded the Dubai government, that it 
was better policy to have a “voluntary arrangement process,”91 (VAP), whereby Du-
bai World would “continue to manage its affairs . . . and, with . . . [more easily 
accessible] protection of a moratorium, pursue and, if approved, implement a re-
structuring.”92  Under this VAP system, which drew upon Chapter 11 of the Amer-
ican Bankruptcy Code, the corporation could propose a plan to restructure its debt 
obligations.  So long as two-thirds “in value . . . of any class of creditors”93 ap-
proved, all creditors would be bound.94 
The framers added another important feature to Decree 57, allowing for a fidu-
ciary “to represent the company in foreign insolvency proceedings.”95  In practice, 
the process would work in the following manner: Dubai World would receive an 
order from a local court in Dubai approving of a moratorium on a set of creditors’ 
claims; then the representative would take this order to the U.S.; finally, because of 
the presence of Chapter 15 in the American Bankruptcy Code,96 there would be a 
                                                          
Interview with Aaron Bielenberg, supra note 60.  See also Telephone Interview with Augusto Sasso, 
supra note 65. 
 87. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 4; Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 
59. 
 88. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 1; Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 
59. 
 89. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 1-2; Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 
59. 
 90. Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59. 
 91. See Decree No. 57 of 2009 Establishing a Tribunal to decide the Disputes Related to the Settlement 
of the Financial Position of Dubai World and its Subsidiaries, § 2, arts. 9-16 (U.A.E.) [hereinafter Decree 
No. 57]; Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 1-2. 
 92. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 1; Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 
59. 
 93. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 4. 
 94. Note, under the English system the ability to ‘cram down’ such a plan upon dissenting creditors 
was much more difficult, and a key reason the Americans saw the U.K. insolvency regime as unfriendly 
to debtors.  See Decree No. 57, supra note 91, § 2, art. 14; Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 4; 
Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59; Telephone Interview with Aaron Bielenberg, 
supra note 60; Telephone Interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65. 
 95. LINKLATERS, BRIEFING NOTE: DUBAI WORLD RESTRUCTURING DECREE NO. 57 OF 2009 4 (Dec. 
2009), http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/Insights/DubaiWorldRestructuringDecree.pdf. 
 96. Chapter 15 was added to the Bankruptcy Code by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005. Its purpose is to provide procedures for insolvency cases between parties in more 
than one country. Chapter 15 cases are generally brought in the U.S. after a primary proceeding is 
brought in another country. See Chapter 15 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-15-bankruptcy-basics 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Basics]. See also Chapter 15 Database of U.S. Cross-
border Cases, GLOB. INSOLVENCY,  http://globalinsolvency.com/chapter15 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016) 
[hereinafter Database of U.S. Cross-border Cases]. 
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strong presumption for enforcing the Dubai order within the U.S. courts.97  Assum-
ing enforcement occurred, creditors would be blocked from seizing the assets of 
Dubai World’s (many) U.S. holdings.98  Moreover, other potential creditors would 
be hard-pressed to defy such an American judgment, because of the respect U.S. 
courts hold in the area of insolvency.  In other words, these creditors would likely 
refrain from challenging this order in the U.S. or from trying to seize assets of Dubai 
World in another jurisdiction, where a court there would no-doubt examine what its 
U.S. counterpart had done.99 
Of course, this above discussion is premised on Dubai World first receiving an 
order from a local Dubai court.  However, the question for Decree 57’s framers was: 
which local courts should govern?  As already mentioned, because U.A.E. insol-
vency law would not apply, the domestic Arabic language courts could not have 
jurisdiction.  Both the external advisors and Dubai government officials decided 
that a new court needed to be created to address the issues tied specifically to the 
corporation.  Decree 57 thus established the Dubai World Tribunal (DWT), which 
was proposed to be located within the DIFC, although organizationally it was to be 
separate from the DIFC Courts. 
Overlap between the two, however, was inevitable.  Initially, Decree 57 pro-
vided that the DWT was to have three members, with all of the judges coming di-
rectly from the DIFC Courts: Sir Anthony Evans, Michael Hwang, and Sir John 
Chadwick.100  Each of these judges was distinguished and respected.  Each also had 
international commercial experience and great familiarity with the Dubai land-
scape.101  Understandably then, the external and Emirati drafters wanted to have 
these three judges on the DWT.  In addition, the framers knew that time was of the 
essence, and, because the logistics were simple,102 it made sense to ask them to 
serve. 
                                                          
 97. See Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 96; Database of U.S. Cross-border Cases, supra note 96.  Tel-
ephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59. 
 98. See Pedro A. Jimenez & Mark G. Douglas, Chapter 15 Recognition Mandatory and Fully Encum-
bered Assets Are ‘Property of the Debtor’ Protected by Automatic Stay, JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS 
Nov./Dec. 2013), http://www.jonesday.com/chapter-15-recognition-mandatory-and-fully-encumbered-
assets-are-property-of-the-debtor-protected-by-automatic-stay-11-30-2013/. See also Bruce Nathan & 
Eric Horn, Demystifying Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, BUS. CREDIT, June 2009, at 1; Telephone 
Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59. 
 99. See Mark G. Douglas, Cross-Border Bankruptcy Battleground: The Importance of Comity (Part 
I), JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS (Mar./Apr. 2010), http://www.jonesday.com/cross-border-bankruptcy-
battleground-the-importance-of-comity-part-i-03-31-2010/. See Nathan & Horn, supra note 98, at 1. In-
terview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59. 
 100. Decree No. 57, supra note 91, art. 2.  About the Tribunal: Tribunal Members, DUBAI WORLD 
TRIBUNAL, http://dubaiworldtribunal.ae/about-the-tribunal/members/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
 101. See About the Tribunal: Tribunal Members, supra note 100. 
 102. The DWT was able to use the world-class administrative facilities of the DIFC Courts, which 
enabled it to come into existence (and accept cases 24 hours a day, seven days a week) only three weeks 
after it was statutorily drafted. 
Email from Mark Beer, DWT Registrar, to Jayanth K. Krishnan (June 17, 2016) (on file with author). 
16
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2016, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss2/8
No. 2] An Innovate Matrix 403 
IV. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE DWT 
A. Jurisdiction and Composition 
Decree 57 set forth the vast powers of the DWT.  For example, the DWT would 
have sole jurisdiction to hear “any demand or claim submitted by or against the 
Corporation.”103  A judgment by the DWT would be final and binding, with no 
appeal possible,104 and the cases within the DWT’s ambit would involve “any and 
all claims brought against Dubai World and its subsidiaries.”105  Primarily, the DWT 
would be in charge of adjudicating and approving the voluntary arrangements on 
the restructuring of Dubai World’s debt, while taking into account the procedural 
and substantive interests of the corporation and the creditors.106  As Dubai’s Direc-
tor General of its Legal Affairs Department, Dr. Lowai Belhoul, declared, “Decree 
[57] establishes a clear, transparent and effective legal framework incorporating in-
ternational best practices in restructuring.”107 
In 2013, the DWT brought another DIFC Court’s judge, Sir David Steel, on to 
the panel.108  Now, several years have passed since the DWT came into existence.  
What has it done; how has it fared; and, most significantly, has it served its purpose?  
Interestingly, while important insolvency and restructuring matters have indeed 
come before it, those are relatively small in number compared to the explosion of 
other types of cases that have emerged, which neither the framers nor initial set of 
DWT judges originally anticipated. 
B. The Insolvency Cases 
Only two major insolvency cases have presented themselves to the DWT, alt-
hough the role of the Tribunal in each has been different.  The more complicated 
case involved “the largest [shipyard and shipbuilding] facility in the Middle 
                                                          
 103. Decree No. (11) of 2010 Amending Decree No. (57) of 2009 Establishing a Tribunal to Decide the 
Disputes Related to the Settlement of the Financial Position of Dubai World and its Subsidiaries, DUBAI 
WORLD TRIBUNAL (Apr. 27, 2010), http://dubaiworldtribunal.ae/decree-no-11-of-2010-amending-de-
cree-no-57-of-2009-esta-blishing-a-tribunal-to-decide-the-disputes-related-to-the-settlemen-t-of-the-fi-
nancial-position-of-dubai-world-and-its-subsidiaries/ (amending Decree No. 57 to include claims 
brought by Dubai World.  Note the original Decree 57 only said that claims could be made “against the 
Corporation.” See Decree No. 57, supra note 91, § 2, art. 24. 
 104. See Decree No. 57, supra note 91, art. 5. 
 105. Email from Mark Beer, supra note 102.  Beer also noted that: “A later amendment to Decree 57 
extended it further to all claims brought by or against Dubai World and its subsidiaries.”  Id.  See Decree 
No. 57, supra note 91, art. 3(1)(a).  See Decree No. (11), supra note 103. 
 106. See Decree No. 57, supra note 91, § 2, arts. 9-24. 
 107. LINKLATERS, supra note 95, at 9. 
 108. Sir Anthony Evans appointed Sir David Steel to this position, per the amending Decree of 2011, 
but effectively the appointment of the panel of DWT judges is subject to the will of the Ruler. See Decree 
No. 57, supra note 91, art. 2. 
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East,”109 Drydocks World, which is among the most prominent subsidiaries of Du-
bai World.  In business for more than thirty years, Drydocks has a global presence, 
and, historically, has been as a leader in the shipping industry.110 
During the late summer of 2011, however, Drydocks experienced a series of 
financial difficulties.  Namely, in August of that year, it decided that it could not 
meet its payment obligations on a $2 billion plus loan it had secured in 2008.111  
Drydocks had intended to use the loan, “involving 15 lenders,”112 to expand its in-
vestments in Singapore and other parts of Southeast Asia.113  Yet three years later, 
it concluded that it did not have the means to service this debt.114  As a result, 
Drydocks began talks with its creditors on restructuring possibilities. 
For the most part, these negotiations proceeded amicably.  But in the fall of 
2011, one creditor – Monarch Alternative Capital, a New York-based hedge fund115 
– argued against the restructuring.  Monarch had purchased a portion of Drydock’s 
obligations (in the amount of $45.5 million116), and subsequently filed suit in a Lon-
don High Court seeking payment in full.117  In February 2012, Monarch received a 
                                                          
 109. About Us: Profile, DRYDOCKS WORLD, http://www.drydocks.gov.ae/en/portal/profile.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2016); See also John Everington, Drydocks World a positive test case for UAE bankruptcy 
reform, THE NAT’L (May 19, 2014), http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/drydocks-world-a-
positive-test-case-for-uae-bankruptcy-reform. 
 110. See, e.g., Drydocks World Receives Prestigious Business Award, OFFSHORE ENERGY TODAY 
(Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/drydocks-world-receives-prestigious-business-
award/; See also Another Honour for Drydocks World, ARABIAN INDUSTRY(Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://www.arabianindustry.com/supply-chain/news/2014/sep/29/another-honour-for-drydocks-world-
4830241/. 
 111. See Everington, supra note 109. See also Simeon Kerr, Dubai Drydocks looks to debt tribunal, 
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/e9fe6d26-7bf2-11e1-9100-00144feab49a; Sim-
eon Kerr, Dubai Drydocks takes $2.2bn debt to tribunal, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2012), 
https://www.ft.com/content/11f91f2e-7c89-11e1-8a27-00144feab49a.  Note, the specifics of the loan 
were that “Drydocks World borrowed . . . $1.7 billion for three years at 170 basis points, or 1.7 percent-
age points, over the London interbank offered rate, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. It bor-
rowed another $500 million for five years at 190 basis points over Libor, the data shows.” Arif Sharif, 
HSBC, BNP Said to Agree on Profit-Sharing Loan for Drydocks, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 4, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-03/drydocks-said-to-pay-part-of-2-25-billion-loan-
over-15-years. 
 112. Drydocks World in talks to restructure $1.7bn debt, CONSTR. WEEK ONLINE (June 1, 2010), 
http://www.constructionweekonline.com/article-8497-drydocks-world-in-talks-to-restructure-17bn-
debt/. 
 113. See Dubai’s Drydocks World pins hopes on Asia, THE GULF (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.thegulfonline.com/articles.aspx?artid=4218; Arif Sharif & Stefania Bianchi, Dyrdocks 
World Seeks 5-Year Loan Plan in Debt Restructuring, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 8, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-08/drydocks-world-seeks-5-year-loan-plan-in-debt-
restructuring-1-; Everington, supra note 109. 
 114. CONSTR. WEEK ONLINE, supra note 112. 
 115. See Everington, supra note 109; Praveen Menon & Dinesh Nair, Threats seen to Dubai World unit 
$2.2 bln debt deal, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/dubaiworld-drydocks-
idUSL5E7MR0AB20111127. 
 116. See Everington, supra note 109; John Everington, Drydocks World restructuring talks unlikely to 
be impacted by Monarch lawsuit, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/332e0ea4-
20c5-11e1-816d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3yyTfFXpv [hereinafter Everington, FIN. TIMES] . 
 117. Monarch filed this case in the U.K. because English law is thought to be more advantageous for 
creditors. The High Court had jurisdiction because Drydocks had holdings and assets in the U.K.  Mon-
arch Master Funding Ltd. v. Drydocks World – Dubai LLC, Drydocks World – Southeast Asia PTE 
Limited, and Drydocks World LLC [2012] EWHC (QB) (Comm) (Eng.).  See Everington, FIN. TIMES, 
supra note 116; THE ASS’N OF INT’L CREDIT & TRADE FIN. PROF’LS, Insolvency Laws in Germany, U.K. 
and the U.S.: A comparative Law Analysis for Trade Creditors, SHUMAKER, LOOP & KENDRICK (2013), 
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judgment from the London court finding in its favor, ordering Drydocks to pay back 
the $45.5 million, in addition to all legal fees.118 
The ruling was a major setback for Drydocks.  There was concern that some of 
its other creditors might be inspired by Monarch’s actions and attempt to opt out of 
the joint agreement and instead pursue individual claims in a similar fashion.119  On 
April 1, 2012, though, Drydocks took a “landmark decision . . . to file for a company 
voluntary arrangement [italics added] (CVA) in the Dubai World Tribunal, using 
the legal framework [Decree 57] put in place in December 2009.”120  Recall that 
such a measure, if approved by the DWT, would allow Drydocks to move forward 
on the deal it had struck with the vast majority of its creditors, and importantly, 
“bind [any] holdout[s]”121 to the agreement, such as Monarch, as well. 
Drydocks hired the well-regarded English barrister, Michael Crystal, to argue 
its case.122  According to Crystal, Monarch was ironically a beneficiary of the CVA.  
This agreement had set forth a partial payment schedule for Drydocks to make to 
its various creditors, including to Monarch.123  Because the CVA was authorized 
under Decree 57 and fell within the DWT’s jurisdiction,124 Crystal contended that 
Monarch was estopped from now claiming that the decree’s provisions did not ap-
ply to it.  Moreover, Monarch’s failure even to appear at the DWT to defend itself 
during oral arguments demonstrated contempt for the Tribunal and for a process 
from which it had clearly benefitted.125 
Ultimately, on August 28, 2012, the DWT formally approved Drydock’s peti-
tion, thereby mandating that Monarch accept the restructuring arrangement made 
with 97.8% of creditors.  Using the ‘cram-down’ method of securing compliance,126 
the DWT sided with Drydocks and went on to reject Monarch’s counter-claim that 
the payments it received via the CVA were meant only to satisfy the English High 
                                                          
http://www.slk-law.com/portalre-
source/DHC.Comparative%20Analysis%20of%20Insolvency%20Laws%20of%20US-UK-Germany. 
 118. See Monarch Master Funding Ltd. v. Drydocks World – Dubai LLC. . See Praveen Menon, U.S. 
hedge fund wins claim against Dubai’s Drydocks, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/ar-
ticle/us-emirates-drydocks-monarch-idUSBRE82D0P220120314. 
 119. See also Simeon Kerr & Camilla Hall, Dubai Drydocks protected in landmark case, FIN. TIMES 
(Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e6a4dbf8-f5bc-11e1-bf76-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3ykDGBjiP (regarding the agreement negotiations, “Monarch declined to vote 
. . . .”). 
 120. Everington, supra note 109. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Michael Crystal et al., Thwarting dissenting creditors, SOUTH SQUARE DIGEST, Nov. 2013, at 
2-7, http://www.southsquare.com/files/South-Square-Digest-November2013.pdf; Frank Kane, hedge 
fund’s pursuit of Drydocks offers test case for Dubai, THE NAT’L (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.thena-
tional.ae/business/industry-insights/finance/hedge-funds-pursuit-of-drydocks-offers-test-case-for-dubai 
(Note that the date on this article is April 25, 2013, but it should be 2012.). 
 123. See Kane, supra note 122; Michael Crystal et al., supra note 122, at 2-7. 
 124. See Kane, supra note 122; Michael Crystal et al., supra note 122, at 2-7.   See also Monarch 
Master Funding Ltd. v. Drydocks World – Dubai LLC (DWT/VAN/0001/2012 – Reasons for Judgment) 
(July 15, 2013) [hereinafter Reasons for Judgment). 
 125. See Kane, supra note 122(quoting Sir Anthony Evans). 
 126. Where, as discussed above, dissenting creditors are forced to adhere to the pact, so long as 75% 
or more of the creditors agree to a restructuring of the debt. See Chris Mallon, Voting and cram-down, 
in LEXIS PSL RESTRUCTURING & INSOLVENCY (June 2012), https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/re-
structuringandinsolvency/document/393783/55MK-MBW1-F18D-T0DS-00000-
00/Schemes_of_arrangement_voting_and_cram_down; Decree No. 57, supra note 91, § 2, art. 14. See 
also Interview with Ian Schneider, Price Waterhouse Coopers, in London, U.K. (Sept. 8, 2015). 
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Court ruling.127  Rather, the DWT held that it had jurisdiction over Monarch and 
needed to protect the interests of the other creditors, which could only best be done 
by affirming the CVA and enjoining Monarch from further interference.128  As Sir 
Anthony Evans wrote in his opinion, using “Decree 57 [in this manner] was a bold 
and imaginative step forward in the restructuring of the finances of Dubai.”129  Soon 
thereafter, Drydocks and Monarch reached a settlement.  Subsequently, although 
the specifics were not made public, one report from that time stated that Drydocks 
did eventually restructure its debts by taking out “a new loan of about between 
$700m and $800m to be repaid over five years, with another $1.4bn to $1.5bn being 
offered in 15-year ‘profit participation notes’ that could see debt transferred into 
equity after 10 years.”130 
Preceding Drydocks was another matter that involved Dubai World itself.  This 
Dubai World restructuring was a massive, complicated project.  Within Dubai 
World, there were more than 180 entities and several dozen different creditors.131  
Recall from above, in late 2009 Dubai World notified its creditors that it did not 
have enough money on-hand to meet its debt obligations (approx. $60 billion).  Be-
cause the credit market was all but frozen, Dubai World had no way to access fur-
ther capital.132  At the same time, many of these creditors wanted Dubai World to 
sell off assets immediately so that they could be paid.  But had such a move oc-
curred, analysts contend that these creditors would have only received 45 cents on 
the dollar on such sales.133  Therefore, the crafting and subsequent invocation of 
Decree 57, these analysts suggest, while working to the obvious immediate benefit 
of Dubai World, also helped preserve asset-value for creditors—even if the latter 
did not recognize it.  By facilitating a long-term restructuring that would lead to a 
renewed, healthy Dubai World, creditors would eventually be able to recover more 
than the projected 45 cents on the dollar (if not full value) for the loans they had 
made.134  It would just take time, patience, and vision. 
Following Dubai World’s announcement at the end of 2009 that it would sus-
pend any further payments on its debt, the next several months involved highly in-
tense negotiations between the conglomerate and its many creditors.  By the fall of 
2010, Dubai World had received approval on the restructuring of its immediate debt 
obligations, totaling $25 billion, from nearly all its creditors.135  There was just one 
                                                          
 127. See Reasons for Judgement, supra note 124; see also Michael Crystal et al., supra note 122, at 7. 
 128. See Reasons for Judgement, supra note 124; see also Michael Crystal et al., supra note 122, at 7. 
 129. See Kerr & Hall, supra note 119. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Telephone interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65; see also Robin Wigglesworth, US cred-
itor snubs deal on Dubai World debt, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2010), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/14fd5dfc-bea8-11df-a755-00144feab49a. 
 132. Telephone interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65. 
 133. Id. See also Paul Tharp, Dubai debt rescue sends stocks higher, N.Y. POST (Dec. 11, 2009), 
http://nypost.com/2009/12/11/dubai-debt-rescue-sends-stocks-higher/; Dubai debt concerns spread be-
yond Dubai World, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-dubai-
idUSTRE5B82FI20091209. 
 134. Telephone interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65. 
 135. Telephone interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65. See also Wigglesworth, supra note 131; 
Dubai World gets creditors’ nod for debt restructuring plan, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Sept. 10, 2010), 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/international-business/Dubai-World-gets-creditors-nod-
for-debt-restructuring-plan/articleshow/6531095.cms.  Note that of this amount, “$14.4bn [was] owed 
to financial creditors, [and] $10bn [was] owed to the Dubai government . . . .” Anousha Sakoui, Dubai 
World secures $25bn restructuring, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2010), 
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hold-up.  An American fund, Aurelius Capital Management, refused to approve the 
restructuring.136  Aurelius held $5 million of Dubai World’s debt and sought repay-
ment within the original timeline.  Dubai World, of course, had the option of going 
to the DWT and seeking a cram-down enforcement measure against Aurelius, but 
because the Tribunal had not yet been used in such a manner, it was unclear as to 
how long this process would take. 
Fortunately, for all parties involved, one of the creditors, Deutsche Bank came 
to the rescue.  In June of 2010, Deutsche Bank had sold some of the debt it held in 
Dubai World “to several distressed debt funds, one of which was Aurelius.”137  
While almost all of the creditors had approved the restructuring plan for Dubai 
World, as stated, one did not – Aurelius.138  Subsequently, Deutsche Bank inter-
vened, repurchased the debt back from Aurelius, and then gave its approval to the 
restructuring proposal.139  By October 2010, with all the creditors on board, a re-
structuring deal was reached.140  The particulars included a two-part scheme, with 
the first major repayment occurring in 2015, followed by another in 2018.141 
In January 2015, Dubai World sought further restructuring of the 2018 pay-
ments to extend out until 2022.142  Unlike what occurred in 2010, Dubai World 
approached the DWT for assistance and invoked Decree 57, because while the two-
thirds creditor-acceptance requirement had been met, it was unclear if unanimity 
would be achieved.  For Dubai World, it was important to be ready to litigate a 
                                                          
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a5ddfd68-e135-11df-90b7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz41TSenjHh.  Per-
haps the most well-known was a “$4 billion sukuk, or Islamic bond, of Dubai World’s developer, 
Nakheel, which was especially known for the construction of the Dubai Palm Islands.”  Omar Salah, 
Dubai Debt Crisis: A Legal Analysis of the Nakheel Sukuk, 4 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 19, 19 (2010).  For 
other articles that discuss this specific Nakheel debt, see Simeon Kerr, Nakheel signs agreement with 
trade creditors, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/3c22df10-5157-11df-bed9-
00144feab49a; Asa Fitch, Clock ticking on Nakheel debt, THE NAT’L (Aug. 16, 2009), http://www.the-
national.ae/business/banking/clock-ticking-on-nakheel-debt; Michael Rainey & Sara E. Carmody, King 
& Spalding: Dubai World Restructuring – Decree No. 57, KING & SPAULDING (Dec. 14, 2009), 
http://www.kslaw.com/library/publication/DubaiWorldRestructuring_DecreeNo57.pdf. Note, in the 
next section of the paper, there will be further discussion of Nakheel, in particular, as it was the most 
frequent player in non-insolvency DWT cases.  For the discussion here, however, because this insol-
vency-based restructuring involved Dubai World as a conglomerate, Dubai World will be the focus, 
rather than its subsidiaries. 
 136. See Wigglesworth, supra note 131.  See also Sakoui, supra note 135. 
 137. Sakoui, supra note 135. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id.  Sakoui reports that Aurelius made a profit on the selling of this debt to Deutsche Bank.  
Id. 
 140. See Wigglesworth, supra note 131; Sakoui, supra note 135; Simeon Kerr, Dubai World secures 
deal to restructure $14.6bn debt, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7d8344dc-
9a67-11e4-8426-00144feabdc0.html; Telephone interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65. 
 141. See Kerr, supra note 140. 
 142. DWT/VAN/0001/2015 (1) Dubai World (2) Dubai World Group Finance Limited (3) Istithmar 
World Holdings LLC (4) Istithmar World PJSC (5) Port & Free Zone World FZE-VAN Directions Order, 
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cram-down Decree 57 motion in the Tribunal, if necessary.  As it turned out, how-
ever, later that month Dubai World achieved “100 percent support”143 for the re-
structuring, resulting in the Tribunal issuing a final approval order on the new ar-
rangement.144 
The Drydocks and Dubai World insolvency cases highlight the power that De-
cree 57 had in helping to bring about resolutions to both these complicated restruc-
turing matters.  Both cases settled,145 but based on the information collected, it is 
clear that the various parties saw the DWT as a legitimate body that had the author-
ity and power to make findings that would indeed need to be followed.  Rather than 
risking an adverse judgment, the parties thus concluded that it would be in their 
respective interests to settle.146 
C. The Non-Insolvency Cases 
At the time of this writing, a swath of cases, unrelated to the abovementioned 
insolvency issues has come before the DWT.  Recall, the DWT had originally been 
conceived expediting the financial restructuring of Dubai World.  But because the 
language of Decree 57 allowed for a broader interpretation of other Dubai World-
related cases to be heard in front of the DWT, the Tribunal took this opportunity to 
serve as the arbiter of these separate disputes.  Appendix A lists these other cases 
that have entered onto the DWT’s docket.  As the data shows, 38 have seen the 
Tribunal issue a judgment, 16 settled before a formal order was made, 6 cases were 
dismissed, and 26 were discontinued. 
Of these 38 cases that reached verdict, 31 involved Nakheel – Dubai World’s 
primary subsidiary, which had its own set of financial troubles after the collapse of 
the real estate market in the U.A.E.  (Nakheel was a party to 9 of the 15 cases that 
settled and 18 of the ones in the remaining two categories.)  Nakheel was “the big-
gest user of the DWT since its creation.”147 
In analyzing the cases in which Nakheel was a party, several interesting obser-
vations emerge.  To begin, in those cases that went to judgment, Nakheel prevailed 
outright in only a relatively small number.  These cases involved property develop-
ment or contract for services.  For example, in Penguin Marine Boat Services LLC 
v. The World (where Nakheel was the defendant), the Tribunal ruled in favor of the 
latter because of a lack of evidence that a sufficient contract even existed in the first 
place.148  Similarly, in Futtain Hussein Fares Al Baddad v. Palm Deira LLC (where 
again Nakheel was the main defendant), the Tribunal sided with Nakheel because 
the claimant simply could not produce the agreement it sought to enforce.149  In 
another dispute, Nakheel also was able to stave off a complaint by dissatisfied 
                                                          
 143. UPDATE 1-Dubai World’s debt restructuring gets 100 pct creditor backing, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 
2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/dubai-world-restructuring-idUSL5N0VP06220150215. 
 144. See DWT, supra note 142. 
 145. Albeit with Drydocks, the settlement occurred after the cram-down order, whereas with Dubai 
World it was before it.  Id. 
 146. Id.  Or as Mnookin and Kornhauser have classically argued, “bargain[…] in the shadow of the 
law.”  Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979). 
 147. Email from John Davidson, General Counsel, Nakheel, to Jayanth K. Krishnan (Sept 13, 2015). 
 148. Penguin Marine Boat Services LLC v. The World, DWT-0025-2010 (5/22/2011). 
 149. Futtain Hussein Fares Al Baddad v. Palm Deira LLC, DWT-0006-2010 (8/7/2011). 
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claimants from one of its construction projects,150 and, Nakheel was permitted to 
retain the earnest money it collected after an investment company decided to cancel 
a construction project for which it had contracted.151 
In three different cases, Nakheel served as the claimant, and it prevailed in 
each.  In The World LLC v. Al Memari Development Limited, Nakheel received a 
default judgment because the defendant failed to meet its final payment on an in-
stallment contract.152  In Nakheel PJSC v. Al Meraikhi, though the parties had ini-
tially agreed to a financial restructuring, the defendant later sought to renege.  The 
Tribunal refused to allow the defendant to do so and ruled in favor of Nakheel.153  
In a third case, Nakheel had signed a contract to receive a license fee from the de-
fendant, but when it came time for payment, the defendant refused.  Nakheel sued 
and subsequently won.154 
Yet in most of the remaining cases that went to judgment, Nakheel was on the 
losing end.  The issue in several of these disputes involved claimants who argued 
that Nakheel simply refused to follow through on deals that it had made.155  Shokat 
Dalal v. Nakheel PJSC156 exemplifies this point.  In this case, the claimant was 
planning to purchase a set of properties from Nakheel, but after the real estate mar-
ket in Dubai collapsed, Nakheel no longer wished to sell.157  The claimant was based 
outside of Dubai; during the course of the proceeding, Nakheel was able to secure 
an arrest notice against him, which deterred the claimant from wanting to return to 
the Emirate.158  Nakheel, however, argued that it could not receive a fair hearing if 
the claimant was not present in person.159  The Tribunal rejected this argument and 
                                                          
 150. City D Investments Limited v. The World LLC & Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0024-2011 (9/19/2013). 
 151. Arady Alaman Real Estate Investments LLC v. The World, DWT-0036-2011 (9/26/2013). 
 152. The World LLC v. Al Memari Development Limited, DWT-0022-2011 (7/8/2014). 
 153. Nakheel PJSC v. Al Meraikhi, DWT-0028-2011 (9/21/2011). 
 154. The World LLC v. Penguin Marine Boat Services LLC, DWT-0008-2011 (2/6/2013). 
 155. See, e.g., CDG FZE v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0008-2010 (12/25/2014) (holding that the claimant 
was entitled to damages from Nakheel, plus interest on those delayed payments that Nakheel had not yet 
made); Paramount International Trading Limited v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0019-2010 (2/14/2011) (hold-
ing that Nakheel was bound to honor a contract that it had signed with the claimant); Nurol LLC v. 
Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0011-2011 (8/4/2011); (holding that Nakheel could not unilaterally cancel a con-
tract it signed simply because it was convenient to do so); Ahmed Butti Ahmed Almuhairi v. Nakheel 
PJSC, DWT-0014-2011 (9/3/2013) (holding Nakheel to be bound to a discounted price on properties it 
had contracted with the claimant); Proidea Contracting Interior Design LLC v. Nakheel, DWT-0020-
2010 (9/3/2013) (holding that Nakheel was bound to pay the claimant for services for which it had con-
tracted); Hedley International Emirates Contracting LLC v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT 0017-2011 (9/13/203) 
(holding that just because Nakheel faced financial difficulties it still owed the respective claimants 
money for services for which it (Nakheel) had contracted); relatedly, also see Reaction Project Manage-
ment v. Dubai Maritime City, DWT-0039-2011 (9/3/2013) (holding Nakheel liable for consultancy fees 
it received from the claimant); P & T Architects and Engineers LTD v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0022-2010 
(11/22/2011); Technical Architects General Contracting Company LLC v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0018-
2010 (4/30/2013); Far East Investment Holdings Limited v. The World LLC, DWT-0027-2011 
(11/11/2013) (holding Nakheel must pay a refund to the claimant for failure to build-up a plot in The 
World Development); Gaber Nema Kenger v. The Palm Jebel Ali LLC, DWT-0009-2011 (7/8/2014) 
and Azia Holding Limited v. The World, DWT-0040-2011 (12/25/2014) (holding in both cases that the 
respective claimants were entitled to cancel a contract it signed with the defendant because of the latter’s 
failure to perform). 
 156. Shokat Dalal v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0023-2010 (1/23/2014). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  Also see Email from Mark Beer, supra note 102. 
 159. Shokat Dalal v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0023-2010; Email from Mark Beer, supra note 102. 
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said that so long as the claimant could appear via videoconference, Nakheel’s inter-
ests would be safeguarded.160  The claimant subsequently prevailed, but perhaps 
more noteworthy, the decision was important because it confirmed the Tribunal’s 
commitment to allow parties to access its services from around the world in a timely 
and cost-savings manner.161 
Then there are instances where Nakheel was accused of constructing properties 
with deficiencies162 or failing to build a project altogether,163 and in both these types 
of matters it lost as well.  In fact, regarding the latter, consider an interesting case 
that came before the Tribunal involving the intersection between property law, con-
tract law, and religious liberty.  In this matter,164 the claimant was a trading com-
pany that had bought a parcel of land from Nakheel.  After time passed and no 
construction had been done on the project, the claimant approached Nakheel for an 
explanation and was told that the site was classified as religiously holy.165  As a 
result, Nakheel was barred from proceeding with the construction.166  At trial, the 
trading company asked for restitution along with damages, and the Tribunal 
agreed,167 holding that the religious prohibition on construction did not insulate 
Nakheel from liability.168 
Nakheel failed to prevail in another set of cases, this time involving high profile 
employment law disputes.  In the first matter, Nakheel’s former General Counsel, 
David John Nicholson, sued the company, claiming that he had been terminated 
with only one month’s notice when his contract required a notice period of three 
months.169  The Tribunal found in Nicholson’s favor and awarded him more than 
$200,000 USD in damages.170  (Although Nakheel was able to lower “a legal fees 
bill claim by . . . [Nicholson] from AED 473,119 ($128,803) to AED 132,000 
($36,000) at a [subsequent] Dubai World Tribunal costs hearing.”171) 
In the second case, Nakheel’s former Chief Executive Officer, Chris O’Don-
nell, sued the company in June 2011 on breach of contract grounds.172  O’Donnell 
had led Nakheel for five years before departing, and argued that the company owed 
him a set of incentive packages.173  In response, Nakheel contended that O’Donnell 
                                                          
 160. Shokat Dalal v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0023-2010; Email from Mark Beer, supra note 102. 
 161. Shokat Dalal v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0023-2010; Email from Mark Beer, supra note 102. 
 162. Vinod Kumar Dang v. Jumeirah Islands LLC, DWT-0003-2010 (3/9/2011). 
 163. Samer Farhan Farhat v. International City – Nakheel, DWT-0018-2011 (9/3/2013). 
 164. Greenfield Trading Company FZC v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0038-2011 (11/26/2015). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. David John Nicholson v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0020-2011 (2/2/2012). 
 170. Id; see also Shane McGinley, Ex-Nakheel CEO’s Legal Battle May Spur New Lawsuits, ARABIAN 
BUS. (Dec. 4, 2011), http://m.arabianbusiness.com/ex-nakheel-ceo-s-legal-battle-may-spur-new-law-
suits-433241.html. 
 171. Duncan Hare, Nakheel Lawyers Reduce Former Counsel’s Bill, CONSTR. WEEK ONLINE (Jan. 29, 
2012), http://www.constructionweekonline.com/article-15439-nakheel-lawyers-reduce-former-coun-
sels-claim-bill/. Note, there was a separate case, David John Nicholson v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0040-
2014, (10/27/2014) that involved the claimant bringing a claim that he was owed an 80% discount on a 
piece of property he purchased from Nakheel.  The parties discontinued the case jointly, and the Tribunal 
gave a consent order to that effect. 
 172. Chris O’Donnell v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0035-2011 (1/23/2014); Shane McGinley, Former CEO 
Chris O’Donnell Sues Nakheel, ARABIAN BUS. (June 23, 2011), http://www.arabianbusiness.com/for-
mer-ceo-chris-o-donnell-sues-nakheel-406646.html#.V1WasbgrLDc. 
 173. Chris O’Donnell v. Nakheel PJSC; McGinley, supra note 172. 
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had simply “decided to leave Nakheel following five years spent with the com-
pany”174 before his contract had even expired; thus, he deserved no further pay-outs.  
Nakheel also questioned the jurisdictional authority of the Tribunal, saying that the 
case “should have been brought to the Ministry of Labour.”175  Nakheel additionally 
cited O’Donnell’s poor performance as justification for not delivering the promised 
incentive packages.176  In February 2012, the Tribunal issued its judgment.  It held 
that the contract was clear on the covenants between the company and O’Donnell, 
and that Nakheel owed more than $3 million in incentive payments to its former 
CEO, along with nearly a quarter of a million dollars in wages for days he had 
worked but had not received compensation.177  The Tribunal also rejected the argu-
ment that it was not the proper venue to adjudicate this claim.178  The case clearly 
involved a matter relating to a Dubai World subsidiary, and given the language of 
Decree 57 (broadly interpreted), the Tribunal found no issue rendering a verdict in 
this type of breach of contract dispute.179 
As demonstrated by the above analysis, the Tribunal has been instrumental in 
deciding a range of cases – both insolvency and non-insolvency based.  In the con-
cluding section, there will be an evaluation of what the Tribunal’s creation and its 
operations have meant for Dubai and, more generally, for those who study the in-
terplay between external and local actors working within a domestic context – but 
a context which has definite global implications. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In more theoretical terms, this study has sought to reframe the old and rather 
tired debate over the extent to which outside legal experts who enter a domestic 
landscape cause more harm than good.  Section II provided an in-depth account of 
                                                          
 174. Chris O’Donnell v. Nakheel PJSC; McGinley, supra note 172; also for quotation, see Ben Roberts, 
Nakheel’s Chris O’Donnell Quits as CEO, CONSTR. WEEK ONLINE (June 9, 2011), http://www.construc-
tionweekonline.com/article-12737-nakheels-chris-odonnell-quits-as-ceo/. 
 175. Shane McGinley, Chris O’Donnell Wins $3.7M Legal Battle with Nakheel, ARABIAN BUS. (Feb. 
9, 2012),  http://www.arabianbusiness.com/chris-o-donnell-wins-3-7m-legal-battle-with-nakheel-
444453.html#.V1Wd-7grLDc [hereinafter McGinley, O’Donnell wins]. 
 176. Id.; see also Chris O’Donnell v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0035-2011 (1/23/2014). 
 177. McGinley, O’Donnell Wins, supra note 175; Chris O’Donnell v. Nakheel PJSC. 
 178. Chris O’Donnell v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0035-2011 (1/23/2014). 
 179. In fact, in a handful of other cases, the Tribunal asserted its jurisdiction where non-insolvency was 
at play.  See, e.g. Simon James Arrol v. Jumeirah Heights LLC, DWT-0016-2011 (6/8/2012) (holding 
that the respondent, a Dubai World subsidiary, was required to pay the claimant an award issued by the 
Dubai International Arbitration Centre); Hedley International Emirates Contracting LLC v. Nakheel 
PJSC, DWT-0006-2011 (6/18/2012) (holding that based on an agreement between the parties, whereby 
Hedley had cancelled the contract, Nakheel was not entitled to any payment); M/S Al Falak International 
Limited v. M/S Nakheel International Co., DWT-0025-2011 (1/23/2014) (holding that Nakheel was lia-
ble to the claimant who had paid to reserve a plot of land but where Nakheel did not follow through and 
complete the signing of the agreement and sale of the property); Nakheel PJSC v. Souq Residence FZCO, 
DWT-0021-2010 (2/23/2014) (holding against Nakheel for not following through on a contract). Several 
months later, this case was settled between the two parties.  See Nakheel and Souq Residences reach 
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the literature that has focused on this subject.  Although there are certainly im-
portant and valuable exceptions to the rule,180 much of the extant research examines 
this topic from a binary perspective: either the arriving external actors help posi-
tively transform the society upon which they are working or they are neo-colonizers 
who exploit a new environment for instrumental purposes.181  In fact, several works 
that concentrate on this latter point often emphasize how it is actually indigenous 
actors who are far more significant in shaping the direction of policy, culture, rights, 
language, and governance of the domestic environment than the interloping external 
figures.182 
Yet the scholarship examining this issue, to-date, has paid far too little attention 
to the exciting developments currently occurring within one intriguing context – 
Dubai.  Dubai is a setting that is heavily engaged with the international economy.  
It is a global marketplace with globally-sophisticated players who come from all 
over the world.  Moreover, its domestic actors – lawyers, business leaders, civil 
society members, and government officials – are equally as sophisticated.  These 
domestic actors recognize their city’s privileged status not only within the region 
but around the globe as well.  The narrative, therefore, of how the financial crisis of 
2008 and 2009 affected Dubai is telling, namely because international and domestic 
stakeholders recognized the need to work in tandem from the outset.  The actors 
from abroad did not have ambitions of colonizing Dubai; nor could they have suc-
ceeded even if they wished.183  Similarly, the domestic actors did not view the for-
eign counterparts as engaging in unwanted encroachment.184  The successful inter-
play between the external experts and their internal colleagues to create and suc-
cessfully operationalize the Dubai World Tribunal adds a nuanced, as-of-yet untold 
story to the elite theory literature.185 
As this article demonstrates, lawyers, judges, business consultants, and ac-
countants from abroad, together with a range of Dubai officials, cooperatively 
drafted a decree that ultimately met with the Emirate Ruler’s approval.  Moreover, 
these colleagues helped launch a key dispute resolution institution that provided 
immense confidence to local and international investors.186  Consider what exists 
within this Arabic-speaking, Islamic-governed environment.   There is a Western-
based, non-appealable financial dispute resolution Tribunal that uses English, ad-
heres to American and British legal principles, has foreign judges, and oversees all 
claims that relate to Dubai World and its subsidiaries, regardless of whether they 
                                                          
 180. See DEZALAY & GARTH, PALACE WARS, supra note 17 (noting how sensitive globalized lawyers 
do take into account local context, culture, and actors); ABEL & LEWIS, supra note 20(explaining how 
lawyers in common law countries can indeed be sensitive to domestic legal needs) 
 181. See discussion supra Section II. 
 182. Id.; see, e.g., Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield, supra note 17 (noting how many Indian legal aca-
demics, to the observations made by the Ford Foundation’s American law professor consultants, were 
sophisticated in thinking about legal education and the legal profession); Krishnan, Academic SAILERS, 
supra note 17 (noting how the premise of Ford’s legal education work in Africa was to rely greatly on 
local law professors and students for guidance). 
 183. See discussion supra Section III.D. 
 184. See discussion supra Section III.D. 
 185. See discussion supra Section III.D. 
 186. See discussion supra Section III.D and Section IV. 
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are insolvency-focused or not.  Furthermore, the Tribunal has regularly and thought-
fully referenced, respected, and interpreted U.A.E. law.  A forthcoming report by 
the Tribunal’s staff outlines this point in detail.187 
Specifically, the report tracks how in several areas – civil procedure, real estate, 
commercial law, and labor law – various domestic statutory provisions appear rel-
evant when combing through the facts of the cases that have come before the Tri-
bunal.  As the report discusses, the Tribunal indeed examines U.A.E. law and then 
analyzes its applicability before rendering a verdict.188  The Tribunal’s engagement 
in this manner clearly has helped it retain a strong sense of legitimacy and respect 
from the Dubai government, even though the government has been on the losing 
side of many cases.  As the report concludes:[the] Tribunal’s interpretations of UAE 
law show that the outcome in many cases will be the same under Civil and Common 
law principles. While the Tribunal may have a different thought process for inter-
preting UAE law, using many Common law principles, the end result is consistent 
with UAE law. The exercise of interpreting UAE law in the Dubai World Tribunal 
shows that Civil and Common law traditions share many aspects of substantive law. 
These traditions both seek to maximise justice and are thus not as different as they 
may seem.189  It is worth pondering why the Tribunal has worked so well within a 
context that has never seen such an institution in the past.  In part, the answer lies 
in how cataclysmic the financial crisis at the time was, which required the govern-
ment to take unprecedented action or else risk the collapse of its entire economic 
system.  Relying solely on nationalist means of remedying Dubai World’s problems 
was not an option.  The local Dubai courts were not equipped to handle these com-
plicated cases; and the existing laws on the books could not fully address the mon-
umental and diverse array of claims and defenses being made by creditors and debt-
ors, respectively.  These desperate times called for bold, creative, and global 
measures to confront a situation that the Dubai government had never witnessed.  
In Aristotelian terms, it was essential for Dubai to embrace a new approach for 
tackling the crisis if it wished to remain a relevant, sovereign, and economic player 
on the world’s stage. 
Another part of the story, however, is that those involved, from all sides, were 
not caricatures of stereotypical outsiders or insiders.  Surely, each of the pivotal 
figures here had objectives and instrumental ends, but they were complex, with lay-
ered identities, motivations, and aspirations.  And finally, globalization deeply in-
fluenced the way the Tribunal has functioned.  The opportunities, knowledge, and 
information brought about by technology (not to mention the seamlessness of 
travel) have enabled easier communication between the external experts and Dubai 
officials, paving the way for a solution to the Emirate’s crisis.  In sum, all these 
experiences should serve as a model for scholars of dispute resolution and for poli-
cymakers in other markets seeking to build strong rule of law regimes – regimes 
                                                          
 187. See DUBAI WORLD TRIBUNAL STAFF REPORT, DUBAI WORLD TRIBUNAL INTERPRETATIONS OF 
U.A.E. LAW (forthcoming 2016). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 13.  This idea of British-style courts considering local laws before reaching an opinion has 
been documented in the literature in detail – namely during the colonial era.  (See, e.g., Marc Galanter 
and Jayanth K. Krishnan, Personal Law and Human Rights in India and Israel, 34 ISR. L. REV. 98 
(2000)).  The situation here of the development of a “body of case law showing the Dubai World Tribu-
nal’s interpretations of UAE law” in this type of post-colonial context does appear novel.  See DUBAI 
WORLD TRIBUNAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 187, at 1. 
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that can be viewed as legitimate and equitable by both international and domestic 
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 190. The authors received permission from the Registrar of the DWT to summarize and excerpt, from 
the DWT website and database, the information presented in the below Appendix.  The Registrar over-
sees and is in charge of the management and compilation of the DWT cases in the database.  Citations 
per case also are provided below. 
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wala v. Al 
Nakheel Com-
pany  

























tracting LLC v. 
Nakheel PJSC  
11/22/2011 9/30/2010 Claimant 
claims that De-
fendant has 
failed to make 
payments re-
















sociates Inc. v. 
Limitless LLC  



















Salem v. Nakheel 
PJSC 
3/20/2012 2/6/2012 Claimant was 
hired by De-
fendant and 















Partners FZC v. 
The World LLC  
9/3/2013 10/6/2010 Claimant can-
celed the reser-
vation contract 
and asks for a 














Limitless LLC v. 
Thani Rashid 
Eissa Al Muhairi  
9/3/2013 1/6/2011 Claimant and 
Defendant 
were both sup-
posed to pay 
for a develop-
ment project, 
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Limitless LLC v. 
Mohammed Ma-
tar Mohamed Al 
Marri  
1/23/2014 1/26/2011 Claimant built 






















v. DP World 
Limited  
12/22/2014 2/26/2014 Defendants 
damaged 





fendant to pay 













tium LLC v. 
Drydocks World  
4/15/2015 1/26/2014 Claimant en-
tered into an 
Agreement 
with Defend-
ant to be its 
sales agent. 
Claimant 
claims he is 
entitled to 
commission 
from the work 
done on the 
buildings. 












v. Nakheel PJSC 

























Asmaa Abd El 
Ghaffar Khalil v. 
Limitless L.L.C  
11/8/2010 4/5/2010 Claimant had a 
3-year contract 





tract before it 
was over. Af-
ter the reply 
was filed, the 
case was 
closed. 
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kept pri-
vate as 











v. The World 
LLC  
2/13/2011 12/15/2010 The Claimant 


































Mr. Raja Hani 
Ghanma v. 
Jumeirah Golf 
Estates LLC  
































failed to pay 




was gifted the 
land and build-
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The World LLC 
v. Asian Devel-
opment Limited  
6/12/2011 6/12/2011 Same facts as 
the case di-
rectly above. 













7/24/2011 5/23/2010 Breach of con-




















tising LLC v. Ibn 
Battuta Mall LLC  
8/4/2011 8/23/2010 Claimant pro-
vided advertis-
ing services to 
he Defendant, 
and the De-







































Limitless LLC v. 
Abdulla Ali Ab-
dulla Al Janahi  
4/19/2012 12/26/2010 Same as case 
directly above. 












Co LLC v. 
Nakheel PJSC  


























John Viola & Ian 
Charles Mathison 
v. Jumeirah Golf 
Estates LLC & 
Nakheel PJSC  
4/3/2013 6/14/2011 Claimants en-






was to draft 
new purchase 
and sale agree-
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Jeroen Van Der 
Geer v. Nakheel 
PJSC  
9/3/2013 6/2/2011 Defendant 
agreed to let 
Claimant pay a 
reduced price 
for a piece of 
property, but 
later Defend-
ant changed its 
mind and said 
the price 
would not be 
reduced. 
















LLC v. Nakheel 
PJSC  
























9/3/2013 6/12/2011 Claimant and 
Defendant en-





to pay the en-
tire purchase 
price, but has 
only paid 30% 
to the Claim-
ant. 











ited v. Nakheel 
PJSC  
9/3/2013 6/21/2011 Claimant en-
tered into pur-
chase and sale 
agreements 
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East Limited v. 
Limitless LLC  
5/8/2014 6/5/2013 Breach of con-
tract claim. 
Claim form is 
sealed. 











bai World  
5/9/2013 8/2/2011 Breach of con-
tract claim. 
There are no 
documents 
available. 











Reeyaz Moosa v. 
Jumeirah Golf 
Estates LLC 

























Nakheel PJSC  








tled to a dis-




that he would 




count to be ap-























v. Nakheel PJSC  
11/30/2015 8/1/2011 Breach of con-
tract claim. 
There are no 
documents 
available. 




nal due to 
non-activ-
ity of the 
Parties. 
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Mr. Magdy El 
Raddaf & Mrs. 
Carmen El Rad-
daf v. Marina 
Residences LLC 
11/30/2015 3/9/2011 Breach of con-
tract claim. No 
documents 
available. 




nal due to 
non-activ-








moria LLC v. 
Nakheel PJSC  
1/5/2011 1/4/2011 This dispute 
centered 
around a down 
payment on 
property and 
how much was 
to be paid in 
advance/how 
much should 
be credited to 
the eventual 
purchase. 














Nakheel PJSC  
5/3/2011 1/25/2011 Claimants 
claim that they 
were led by 
Nakheel to be-




ments on their 
properties. 

















Estate Broker v. 
Nakheel  




for acting as a 
real estate bro-
ker for the De-
fendant. 



















tional City LLC  
5/22/2013 7/4/2011 Claimant en-





was to turn 
property over 
to Claimant by 
a certain date 
and failed to 
do so. The 
Claimant 
wants the Tri-
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CDM Smith Inc. 
v. Nakheel PJSC  
9/3/2013 1/2/2013 Defendant 
hired Claimant 
as a consultant, 
but it was una-




























opment Ltd v. 
Nakheel PJSC  
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